In a number of cases in which it has sole jurisdiction to interpret provisions contained in joint agreements, the Court has relyed on the Community`s interest or on the obligation of (close) cooperation. As I will also explain in Chapter 13, this case law is an example of the fact that loyalty is the basis of the different obligations imposed on Member States under EU law. I will focus more specifically on how loyalty works in terms of the interpretation of mixed agreements. We will see that this principle plays a role both for the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the context of the pre-procedure and for the enforcement procedures. However, it is not always clear why loyalty was invoked in some of these cases and not in others. The justification, both in herms and in Dior, was therefore the uniformity of the Union`s legal order, which would be compromised if a neutral provision were interpreted differently depending on the circumstances of its application. This has been criticised for the application of uniformity in (national) cases, however, it is reasonable not to allow the courts of the Member States to interpret a provision of a mixed agreement in a different way than that of the Court of The Union147.147 An adversarial national assessment, for example on the direct effects of Article 50 TRIPS, could raise doubts about the Judgment of the Court of the Union. This interest in coherence is therefore less concerned with the external representation of the Union.148 I would say that the obligation of cooperation mentioned by the Court of Justice in the dior case was rather an instrument to protect the specific interests of the Union mentioned in Herms149. 150 Jurisdiction alone could not justify the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice also applying to situations outside the Union`s jurisdiction. 18 See the corresponding EU Council website on the ratification process of the two agreements: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2011057 (the last call given on 1 September 2016). In Chapter 1, I argued that cooperation missions should be seen as a sub-category of a more general duty of loyalty.51 Cooperation missions are often seen as an expression of procedural constraints for Member States` actions at the external level.52 In a number of cases with joint agreements, the Court of Justice has linked these cooperation obligations to the requirement of uniformity. As I said in the following terms: with regard to ratification by the Member States, I would say that the reason for a delay in ratification by the Member States is crucial, as is the Union`s interest in a rapid entry into force of the agreement in question.
The stronger and more specific these interests are, the stronger the obligation to Member States will be.134 If the Union therefore has a clear interest in ratifying or ratifying an agreement without delay, Article 4, paragraph 3, (p.203) if the delay is not the case if the delay is due to the attempt to delay or delay ratification.135 This is certainly not the case (p.203) if the delay is due to the attempt to Member State concerned with withdrawing trade concessions from a third country.136 In this regard, it can be argued that such a obligation to ratify is a logical extension of a declaration of EU competence and the consequent distribution of international responsibility.